Rotten Kids With Bad Intentions by Netzer, Nick & Schmutzler, Armin
  
 
 
Socioeconomic Institute 
Sozialökonomisches Institut 
 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper No. 0919 
 
Rotten Kids with Bad Intentions 
 
Nick Netzer, Armin Schmutzler 
 
Revised version, November 2011  
 
 
Socioeconomic Institute 
University of Zurich 
 
Working Paper No. 0919 
 
Rotten Kids with Bad Intentions 
 
 
 
 
 
Revised version, November 2011 
 
Author's address: Nick Netzer 
 E-mail: nick.netzer@econ.uzh.ch 
  
 Armin Schmutzler 
 E-mail: armin.schmutzler@econ.uzh.ch 
 
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Publisher  Department of Economics 
Library (Working Paper) 
Rämistrasse 71 
CH-8006 Zurich 
Phone: +41 (0)44 634 21 37 
Fax: +41 (0)44 634 49 82 
URL: http://www.econ.uzh.ch/department/library.html 
E-mail: library@econ.uzh.ch 
Rotten Kids With Bad Intentions∗
Nick Netzer
University of Zürich
Armin Schmutzler
University of Zürich, CEPR and ENCORE
Updated Version
November 2011
Abstract
We examine a “Rotten Kid” model (Becker 1974) where a player with social prefer-
ences interacts with an egoistic player. We assume that social preferences are intention-
based rather than outcome-based. In a very general multi-stage setting we show that
any equilibrium must involve mutually unkind behavior of both players, endogenously
generating negative rather than positive emotions. In a large class of two-stage games
that includes principal-agent and gift-giving games, this prevents the equilibrium from
being materially Pareto efficient. Compared to the subgame-perfect equilibrium with-
out social preferences, efficiency is still generally increased. On the other hand, the
materialistic player has lower whereas the reciprocal player has higher material payoffs,
so that reciprocity does not increase equity: For sufficiently strong reciprocity concerns,
the materialistic player ends up with a negligible share of the gains from trade.
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1 Introduction
One of the earliest and best-known results in the theory of social preferences is Gary Becker’s
Rotten Kid Theorem (Becker 1974, 1981). Becker considers a framework where an egois-
tic player (the “rotten kid”) can take an action that increases joint (“family”) income, but
reduces his own income, before an altruistic player (the “parent”) makes a transfer to the
kid. According to the Rotten Kid Theorem, such one-sided altruism can induce an efficient
outcome, because the kid can expect being rewarded for increasing family income.1 While
the original specification based on altruism is well-suited to describe interactions within the
family, the belief that social preferences can have beneficial effects by facilitating interac-
tions is much more general. For example, Fehr, Gächter, and Kirchsteiger (1997) provide
experimental evidence showing that social preferences can be exploited to motivate workers
and to enforce contracts that would otherwise be infeasible. In other situations, social pref-
erences tend to work in favor of fair (equitable) allocations, sometimes at the cost of lower
economic efficiency (Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels 2000). In a more recent
paper, Benjamin (2010) presents the most benign view according to which both efficiency
and equity are fostered by the existence of one-sided social preferences. His model is cast as a
gift-exchange game where a profit-maximizing firm pays a wage to a worker who then chooses
efforts. Under plausible (and sufficiently strong) social preferences such as inequity-aversion,
both efficiency and equity will emerge.
What the above discussed models have in common is the assumption of outcome-based
social preferences. Experimental evidence, however, suggests that social preferences exhibit
a strong intention-based component (Charness and Rabin 2002, Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher
2003a,b, Falk and Fischbacher 2006). In this paper, we use the framework of psychological
game theory (Geanakoplos et al. 1989, Battigalli and Dufwenberg 2009) to examine the
impact of intention-based reciprocity concepts (Rabin 1993, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger
2004) in the rotten kid framework.
This setting, where one materialistic and one reciprocal player interact, appears natural,
for example, when the relation between profit-maximizing firms and their employees is mod-
eled. Before examining such specific applications, however, we first consider a general game
with finitely many stages, with observed actions and without nature, as in Dufwenberg and
Kirchsteiger (2004). Following Rabin (1993) or Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), the re-
ciprocal player benefits from rewarding kind behavior of the other player with kind behavior
and from punishing unkind behavior with unkind behavior, where kindness is defined rela-
1The result requires that the kid’s consumption is a normal good from the parent’s point of view. See
also Bergstrom (1989) for the role of transferability of utility.
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tive to a reference point. A (sequential) intentions equilibrium (IE) consists of strategies and
correct first- and second-order beliefs such that, in each subgame, the materialistic player
maximizes his payoffs given his first-order beliefs about the other player’s strategy, whereas
the reciprocal player maximizes his utility given his first-order beliefs about the material
player’s strategy and his second-order beliefs about the material player’s first-order beliefs.
Second-order beliefs of the reciprocal player are required to evaluate the perceived kindness
of the materialistic player. We prove a fundamental result for this general set-up. In every
IE of the game, under weak restrictions on the kindness concept and, in particular, on the
reference point, behavior of both agents must be weakly unkind, and with mild additional
restrictions, it must be strictly unkind. Positive kindness is impossible in our rotten kid setup
with one-sided intention-based social preferences, because an egoistic player who maximizes
own material payoffs can never have good intentions. His unkindness then propagates in
equilibrium, because the reciprocal player now wants to be unkind as well. Importantly, this
mutual unkindness is an emerging equilibrium property and hence endogenous. There are
many strategy profiles that are associated with strictly positive kindness values, but none of
them is an intentions equilibrium.
To explore the equilibrium properties further, we then concentrate on a two-stage “action-
reaction” setting as in Becker (1974) and Benjamin (2010), where the materialistic player
moves first, followed by the reciprocal player. The first player’s material payoff is decreas-
ing in own actions (“wages”) and increasing in those of the second player (“efforts”). The
reciprocal player’s material payoff is increasing in the first player’s action. This setting en-
compasses, for instance, standard principal-agent and gift-giving games. As it turns out,
mutual unkindness generally prevents equilibrium from being materially Pareto efficient in
this framework. We then compare the material equilibrium outcomes in IE with those in
the standard subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE), where both players are materialistic. The
first result is that the materialistic player always suffers from the reciprocity of the other
player: His payoffs are lower in any IE than in any SPE. This contrasts sharply with results
obtained for altruism or inequity aversion, where the egoist generally benefits from the other
player’s social preferences.
In a large class of moral hazard games, the wages paid in IE tend to be larger than in
SPE, as could also be expected with outcome-based social preferences. However, they are
not paid to trigger the return of a benevolent gift, but to prevent the second player from
punishing the first player’s bad intentions too strongly. Hence the payoff implications are
fundamentally different. As a consequence of the higher wages, the reciprocal player obtains
higher material payoffs. Note the irony of this result: Even though the reciprocal player
is relatively less concerned with material payoffs than without reciprocity, he ends up with
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higher material payoffs.
The positive effects of reciprocity on wages are very robust, because the materialistic
player benefits in two ways from paying higher wages. As he increases wage payments, (i) he
becomes kinder and the reciprocal player feels less need to punish him, and (ii) punishment
becomes less effective, because when the materialistic player pays higher wages, he loses
less material payoffs from effort reductions. The effects of reciprocity on equilibrium efforts
are more subtle. There are two countervailing effects: On the one hand, effort reacts more
strongly to wage increases than in the SPE, giving the materialistic player incentives to
induce higher efforts. On the other hand, as the materialistic player has to pay higher wages
to induce any given effort level, he will benefit less from an increase in efforts. However, in
several quite familiar examples of the general action-reaction framework, we obtain a positive
effect of reciprocity on efforts.
These findings have interesting implications for efficiency and distribution. In the ex-
amples that we examine, greater effort is desirable from an efficiency perspective. Thus,
reciprocity is indeed efficiency-enhancing compared to the subgame-perfect equilibrium, but
it does usually not suffice for Pareto efficiency. The distributional consequences are, however,
quite surprising. The player who benefits is the reciprocator, while the egoist loses. In the
moral hazard application, for example, this implies that a firm should have little interest in
hiring workers with intention-based social preferences. Also, reciprocity does not generally
lead to greater equity. First, obviously, if the second player has higher material payoffs in the
SPE than the first player, then reciprocity reinforces this inequality. Second, if the reciprocal
player has lower material payoffs in the SPE than the materialistic player, reciprocity only
leads to more equity as long as it is not too pronounced. We are able to show that, when
the agent’s materialistic concerns become negligible, the agent eventually obtains almost the
entire gains from trade, resulting in the strongest possible inequality.
An important technical aspect of the paper concerns the multiplicity of equilibria. Even
though this is arguably a smaller problem when there is only one reciprocal player, multiple
equilibria are still pervasive when reciprocity is strong enough. It is therefore remarkable
that several of our results on the comparison between SPE and IE hold for all of these
equilibria.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a discussion of related literature.
Section 3 introduces the general framework. In Section 4, we provide our general “bad
intentions” result. Section 5 deals with the action-reaction model in detail and Section 6
illustrates the ideas with concrete examples. Section 7 contains a critical discussion of our
results, and Section 8 concludes. Some proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
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2 Related Literature
Among the papers discussed in the previous section, Benjamin (2010) provides the most
general analysis for outcome-based social preferences to which our results can be compared.
The material payoff functions reflect a gift-exchange setup, which is a special case of our
action-reaction model. In an application with Fehr-Schmidt preferences, the equilibrium
wage offer is Pareto efficient if and only if the aversion against treating the principal unfairly
is sufficiently strong, because the worker will exert more efforts as the wage increases. Also,
inequity aversion necessarily works towards equity. This distributional effect of social prefer-
ences differs from our framework with reciprocity. In our framework, even though the player
with social preferences benefits (materially) from having such preferences and the player
with material preferences loses, redistribution will be excessive for sufficiently pronounced
reciprocity, in the sense that the material player has much lower payoffs than the reciprocal
player.
Several papers have investigated outcome-based social preferences in specific moral hazard
frameworks. Among them, Dur and Glazer (2008) is most closely related to our contribution.
They study optimal incentives when a worker envies the employer. While the employer is risk-
neutral and has purely materialistic preferences, as in our model, the agent is risk-averse and
envious, with utility depending negatively on the difference between the principal’s profit and
wages. The main results are as follows: As in our model, profits decline as social preferences
become more important. Also, the bonus payment is positively affected by envy. The effects
on wages (base salaries) and efforts are ambiguous.2 Hence our results for intention-based
preferences are closer to those for models of envy than to those for models of altruism or
inequity-aversion. Interestingly, this similarity with models of envy arises endogenously in
our framework of reciprocity that a priori allows for both positive (altruism-type) or negative
(envy-type) emotions.3
Few papers have attempted to model intentions in moral hazard related environments.4
Rabin (1993) presents a simple labor contract example, modelled as a simultaneous gift-
exchange game. Positive kindness is possible in this application because both employer and
employee are assumed to have intention-based social preferences. Ruffle (1999) studies gift
2The authors apply their model to argue that workers should be given stock options in spite of risk
aversion, that stock options for the CEO have the additional cost that they increase worker envy, and to
explain why the public sector (and non-profit organizations more generally) pay lower wages and use incentive
pay less than the private sector.
3Englmaier and Wambach (2010) is a treatment of the moral hazard problem when the agent is inequity
averse. Bartling (2011) analyzes the case with multiple agents. Bartling and von Siemens (2010) examine a
corresponding multiple-agent model with envy.
4Von Siemens (2009) examines intention-based reciprocity in a hold-up problem.
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giving within a psychological game framework, mostly focussing on surprise and related
emotions in a non-strategic setting. In an extension to a simultaneous game with mutual
reciprocity he obtains multiple equilibria, with equal gift exchange dominating when fairness
considerations become important.5 Englmaier and Leider (2011) is closely related to our
contribution in that the authors consider the interaction between a materialistic principal
and a reciprocal agent. Their set-up differs from ours in several respects. To understand
the most important difference, in the central result of our analysis (that the equilibrium is
characterized by mutually unkind behavior) we essentially allow for arbitrary reference points
except those that are at the extremes of the Pareto frontier. Contrary to our approach,
Englmaier and Leider (2011) specify the reference point as one of the extremes. They
consider a payoff for the agent as equitable if he obtains his outside option. This leads to
very different implications. Most importantly, the principal benefits from reciprocity.6 By
construction, he can never be unkind, and as soon as he offers more to the agent than the
outside option, the agent responds by behaving kindly. A similar assumption underlies the
results in Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2000). Here, a profit-maximizing firm generates
positive reciprocity effects from its employee by not hiring an outside worker at a lower
wage. This is possible because there are just two wage levels, with the lower wage being too
unkind as to make it a profitable offer. The conclusions from this strand of literature are
hence largely in line with Fehr, Gächter, and Kirchsteiger (1997): Incentive schemes should
make use of reciprocal motives to improve the outcome, because firms can benefit from gift-
exchange effects. Our analysis provides further support for the efficiency-enhancing role of
reciprocity, but questions the potential benefits for employers.
Finally, Levine (1998), Charness and Rabin (2002) and Falk and Fischbacher (2006)
develop theories that combine intention- and outcome-based components. We will comment
on such combined approaches, and specifically on the relation of our results to those in Falk
and Fischbacher (2006), in Sections 6 and 7.
5The notion of reciprocity invoked by Ruffle (1999) differs from the approach in Rabin (1993) or Dufwen-
berg and Kirchsteiger (2004). He uses fairness terms that do not depend on second-order beliefs.
6The differences between the frameworks imply that different issues are pursued otherwise. Englmaier
and Leider (2011) say nothing about the optimal effort level. However, they can address the question of
whether efforts should optimally be induced with relatively flat incentives (appealing to reciprocity) or with
steep, strongly outcome-dependent incentives.
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3 General Notation and Definitions
We first introduce a general set-up that follows closely Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004),
with one major difference to be emphasized below.
Game and Strategies. As Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), we consider a multi-stage
game with finitely many stages, observed actions and without nature. Hence the players
interact simultaneously every period, but the outcome of the interaction becomes observable
before the next period.7 We restrict attention to two player games. H denotes the set
of histories, where each history is a list of previous actions profiles.8 The symbol ∅ ∈ H
represents the root of the complete game. We let Ai be the set of pure strategies for player
i, with elements ai ∈ Ai that are mappings from H to available actions at the corresponding
information set.
Given ai ∈ Ai and h ∈ H, we denote by ahi the strategy obtained from ai by replacing
all actions that are inconsistent with h by those which are consistent with h, and keeping ai
unchanged otherwise. Hence ahi is an updated strategy that coincides with ai except that,
everywhere along the history h, it prescribes the action for player i that correspond to the
subsequent element in h. In particular, a∅i = ai.9
Beliefs. We denote by bij ∈ Aj player i’s beliefs about player j’s strategy, and by ciji ∈ Ai
player i’s beliefs about player j’s beliefs (about player i’s strategy). Throughout, first- and
second-order beliefs are taken to be point beliefs, which, given our focus on equilibria in
pure strategies, involves no loss of generality. Beliefs can be updated exactly like strategies.
Given a belief bij and a history h, let bhij be the new belief updated from bij, by replacing
all actions that are inconsistent with h by those with are consistent. Analogously, chiji is the
second order belief updated from ciji using player i’s actions that lead to h. We again have
b∅ij = bij and c
∅
iji = ciji.
Material Payoffs. Let A = A1 × A2. We define player i’s material payoffs pii directly on
the set of strategy profiles A, so that pii(ai, aj) is player i’s payoff if the strategy profile is
(ai, aj). Further, for any history h ∈ H, let pii(ai, aj|h) = pii(ahi , ahj ) be the payoff of player
i if the updated profile (ah1 , ah2) is played instead of (a1, a2). In Section 7, we will suggest a
7This includes, as a special case, sequential moves of the players, which can be captured by assigning
singleton action sets to players in periods where they are inactive.
8Each history corresponds to an information set for each player, and is also the root of a subgame.
9The updated strategy ahi should not be confused with ai(h′) or ahi (h′), which is the action that the
strategies ai and ahi , respectively, prescribe in information set h′.
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straightforward generalization of the model in which pii is interpreted as player i’s outcome-
based payoff, which could already contain non-pecuniary components.
Kindness. Based on any collection (ai, bij, ciji)i,j=1,2, i 6=j, we can now assign measures of
kindness and beliefs about them to every information set h ∈ H. We denote by kij(ai, bij|h)
the kindness of i to j in information set h.10 We let λiji(bij, ciji|h) denote player i’s belief
about how kind j is to him in information set h. The definition of kij and λiji will make use
of the concept of equitable payoffs, which are the payoffs that players consider as the norm for
judging the payoff that they give to their opponent, by choice of own strategy. Specifically,
for any h ∈ H, the equitable payoff for this information set and a player i is denoted by
piei (ai|h). It depends both on h and on ai because player i’s behavior after h can be crucial
for determining what j considers equitable, so that the history h alone does not summarize
all information necessary to calculate piei . Then, the kindness terms are defined to be
kij(ai, bij|h) = pij(bij, ai|h)− piej (bij|h)
and
λiji(bij, ciji|h) = pii(ciji, bij|h)− piei (ciji|h).
The idea behind these concepts is that a player i judges his own behavior toward opponent
j as kind (kij > 0) whenever he gives the opponent a payoff that is larger than the equitable
payoff. Negative kindness (kij < 0) arises, correspondingly, if he gives j a smaller payoff
than equitable. The term λiji simply corresponds to player i’s belief about kji. The two
terms kij and λiji will be combined in player i’s utility function in a way that makes him
want to reward kind with kind behavior and punish unkind with unkind behavior (e.g. by
multiplication of kij and λiji). It remains to be specified exactly how the equitable payoff is
calculated. Here, we will deviate from Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) and adopt the
approach by Rabin (1993) instead. Let Πi(ai|h) = {(pii(ahi , aj), pij(aj, ahi ))|aj ∈ Aj} be the
set of payoff pairs that can be achieved if player i plays strategy ahi while player j plays
an arbitrary strategy. Let ΠEi (ai|h) be the Pareto efficient payoff pairs in Πi(ai|h), i.e. it
contains those payoff pairs from Πi(ai|h) for which there is no other payoff pair in Πi(ai|h)
with a strictly larger payoff for one and a payoff at least as large for the other player. We
will then require the equitable payoff piei to be a number strictly between player i’s smallest
and largest payoff in ΠEi (ai|h). Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) proceed analogously
but invoke a different definition of efficiency. We follow Rabin (1993) in defining efficiency
10More accurately, kij should be called player i’s belief about how kind he is to player j, because it is
based on the belief bij . We refrain from using this formulation for simplicity.
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conditional on the strategy ai chosen by player i. This assumption is important, and we will
discuss it in detail in Section 7.
Earlier papers have used (variants of) the average between player i’s largest and smallest
payoff within the efficient set ΠEi (ai|h) as player i’s equitable payoff. We will indeed use this
specific form in our later examples, but some results can be proven based on much weaker
requirements. We only impose the following minimal requirements for every player, strategy,
and history:11
(A1) (i) Whenever ΠEi (ai|h) has more than one element, there exist (pi′i, pi′j) ∈ ΠEi (ai|h) and
(pi′′i , pi
′′
j ) ∈ ΠEi (ai|h) with pi′i < piei (ai|h) < pi′′i .
(ii) If ΠEi (ai|h) = {(pi′i, pi′j)}, then piei (ai|h) = pi′i.
According to (i), the equitable payoff piei (ai|h) does not correspond to an extreme point
within ΠEi (ai|h). This encompasses, for example, specifications where piei (ai|h) is the average
between the largest and the smallest payoff of player i in ΠEi (ai|h), as in earlier contributions.
Our formulation is more general, however, and would for example allow the equitable payoff
to depend on how costly it is for the opponent to give player i a larger payoff within ΠEi (ai|h).
Observe that (A1)(i) does not require that piei (ai|h) is itself the payoff of player i in an element
of ΠEi (ai|h). In addition, we also require the following:
(A2) (i) piei (ai|h) = piei (ahi |h) for both players and all strategies and histories.
(ii) piei (ai|h) = piei (ai|h′) if ahi = ah′i for a player i, strategy ai, and histories h 6= h′.
Assumption (A2)(i) ensures that, for all strategies which coincide after a history h, the equi-
table payoff in h will be the same, no matter by which deviations from the original strategy
the history h has been reached. Part (ii) ensures that if a player has reached a history h by
deviating from ai but then continuing to play according to ai, leading to h′, the equitable
payoff given ai will be the same for h and h′. Assumptions (A2)(i) and (A2)(ii) are triv-
ially satisfied when the equitable payoff depends on the achievable payoffs only, e.g. when
it is defined as the average between the largest and the smallest payoff for player i in ΠEi (ai|h).
Utility. To specify the complete utility functions that players strive to maximize, we start
with a very general approach. Let F : R2 → R be a function that assigns a psychological
utility score F (kij, λiji) to each combination of kindness kij and belief about reciprocated
kindness λiji. Throughout we assume that F (kij, 0) is independent of kij, i.e. player i’s
kindness has no impact on own psychological utility if i expects to be treated neutrally.
11The appendix in Rabin (1993) contains a generalized model with assumptions analogous to (A1). Our
Assumption (A2) is particular to the dynamic setup considered here.
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We also assume that F (kij, λiji) is strictly increasing in kij whenever λiji > 0 and strictly
decreasing if λiji < 0. We do not impose any assumptions about curvature, continuity, or even
differentiability of F .12 In Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), F (kij, λiji) = kijλiji. Rabin
(1993) imposes F (kij, λiji) = λiji(1 + kij). In contrast, our more general formulation would
allow for decreasing marginal psychological utility, i.e. the F is not necessarily multilinear.
Finally, we let yi ≥ 0 denote the relative weight that player i assigns to psychological payoffs.
Then, for every information set h ∈ H and player i, let
Ui(ai, bij, ciji|h) = pii(ai, bij|h) + yiF (kij(ai, bij|h), λiji(bij, ciji|h)) (1)
be player i’s utility in information set h, which is based on material payoffs from updated
strategies, and contains the (updated) reciprocity term added with a weight of yi.
Equilibrium. Following Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), we require sequential ratio-
nality, that is, each player must maximize Ui in each information set h ∈ H. To distinguish
our approach from the sequential reciprocity equilibrium by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger
(2004), due to the differences discussed above, we refer to our (pure strategy) equilibria as
“intentions equilibria”.
Definition 1. A strategy profile (aˆ1, aˆ2) ∈ A is an intentions equilibrium (IE) if for i = 1, 2,
j 6= i, and all h ∈ H,
(i) aˆi ∈ argmaxai∈Ai Ui(ai, bij, ciji|h),
(ii) bij = aˆj, and
(iii) ciji = aˆi.
4 The Intentions of Rotten Kids
From now on, and for the rest of the paper, we will assume that player 1 is materialistic
(y1 = 0) while player 2 is motivated by reciprocal concerns (y2 > 0). In this setting, we
provide the general result that behavior is never kind in any intentions equilibrium.
Proposition 1. Suppose (A1) and (A2) hold and y2 > y1 = 0. Then, in any IE (aˆ1, aˆ2),
it holds that kij(aˆi, aˆj|h) ≤ 0 for i = 1, 2, i 6= j and any h ∈ H that is reached on the
equilibrium path. The inequalities for kij are strict if |ΠEj (aˆj|∅)| ≥ 2.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
12Some combination of such assumptions will, of course, become necessary to guarantee equilibrium exis-
tence, but several general results can be proven without them.
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The Proposition states that, with reciprocity concerns and one materialistic player, any
equilibrium must necessarily involve negative emotions, in every subgame that is reached,
including, of course, the complete game starting from history h = ∅. It is remarkable at
what level of generality this result holds. Specifically, it holds for any (two-player, finite
stage, observed actions, no nature) game under only minimal assumptions (A1) and (A2) on
equitable payoffs and no additional assumptions on F .
To understand the intuition, first consider the perspective of player 1. Since y1 = 0, the
optimality condition for player 1 from Definition 1 simplifies to aˆ1 ∈ argmaxa1∈A1 pi1(a1, aˆ2|h),
where b12 = aˆ2 (condition (ii) in Definition 1) has been substituted. Given any strategy of
player 2, player 1 will choose the strategy that maximizes his material payoffs. Thus, when-
ever there is a conflict of interest between the two players concerning the materially Pareto
efficient allocations that player 1 can induce (|ΠE2 (aˆ2|∅)| ≥ 2), he will avoid leaving more
material payoff on the table than necessary, which is unkind behavior. Player 2 in turn
does not expect to be treated kindly and does not benefit from being kind to player 1
either. A kindness-neutral outcome is possible only if the two players’ material interests
coincide, so that payoff maximization by player 1 simultaneously maximizes player 2’s payoff
(|ΠE2 (aˆ2|∅)| = 1).
This result is in stark contrast to the original Rotten Kid intuition. With altruism on the
side of the parent, a rotten kid anticipates monetary rewards for increasing family income.
Maximizing joint income then becomes the kid’s self-interest. But acts motivated by self-
interest are not kind, so that an analogous argument fails with intention-based preferences.13
As we will discuss in greater detail in Section 5, the resulting IE share quite a few properties
with equilibria under envy preferences (Dur and Glazer 2008), rather than altruism. This
is interesting as our model allows for both positive and negative emotions a priori, and
envy-type behavior arises endogenously.
From this different perspective, Proposition 1 could also be interpreted as an equilibrium
selection result. As already emphasized by Rabin (1993), intention-based preferences gener-
ally imply a multiplicity of equilibria, some of them with kind, others with unkind behavior.
While Rabin (1993) has proven that an equilibrium with negative kindness always exists in
his setup, we show that making one of the players materialistic eliminates any possibility for
positive equilibrium kindness, so that only unkindness survives.
We could even strengthen our result as follows. From the above arguments it is clear
that player 1 chooses a strategy that gives player 2 minimal material payoffs among the
efficient payoff combinations for given a2. This is stronger than just being unkind: it means
13In his interpretation of experimental results, Charness (2004, p. 679) conjectures that employees might
not perceive high wages as kind once they realize that paying these wages is in the employer’s own interest.
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player 1 is as unkind as possible, without violating Pareto efficiency. The same then holds
for player 2, who obtains increasing psychological utility from decreasing player 1’s material
payoff. Formally, in any IE (aˆ1, aˆ2), if a′1 ∈ A1 and (pi1(a′1, aˆ2), pi2(aˆ2, a′1)) ∈ ΠE2 (aˆ2|∅), then
pi2(aˆ2, a
′
1) ≥ pi2(aˆ2, aˆ1), and analogously for the other player.
5 Action-Reaction Games
5.1 A Class of Two-Stage Games
To explore the implications of Proposition 1, we now consider a structure analogous to the
original Rotten Kid model, where the materialistic player 1 moves first, followed by the
reciprocal player 2 (“action-reaction games”). Specifically, in the root (h = ∅) player 1
chooses a “wage” from some set W . This wage becomes observable and player 2 reacts by
choosing an “effort” from a set E. We can thus simplify notation and write a1 ∈ A1 = W
and a2 : W → E, with A2 = EW being the set of all such functions. The set of histories can
be written as H = {∅} ∪W .14
We write p˜i1(w, e) and p˜i2(e, w) to denote the players’ payoffs defined on action profiles,
such that the above introduced payoffs pii on strategy profiles are pi1(a1, a2) = p˜i1(a1, a2(a1))
and pi2(a2, a1) = p˜i2(a2(a1), a1). Also, since we always assume that player 1 is materialistic
(y1 = 0), we denote player 2’s reciprocity intensity by y, skipping the player index.
In the action-reaction game, the equitable payoffs also become simpler. We show in the
proof of the following lemma that pie1 is fully determined by the first period wage (the history)
in this case, whereas conversely pie2 depends only on c212. This makes it possible to write the
relevant kindness terms as k21(e, w) and λ212(w, aˆ2) and to simplify the equilibrium definition
as follows.
Lemma 1. Suppose (A2) holds. A strategy profile (aˆ1, aˆ2) ∈ A is an IE of the action-reaction
game if and only if
(i) aˆ1 ∈ argmaxw∈W p˜i1(w, aˆ2(w)), and
(ii) aˆ2(w) ∈ argmaxe∈E p˜i2(e, w) + yF (k21(e, w), λ212(w, aˆ2)) for all w ∈ W .
Proof. According to Definition 1, player 1’s strategy has to be optimal (only) in h = ∅, i.e. the
equilibrium wage must maximize p˜i1(w, aˆ2(w)), because y1 = 0 and b12 = aˆ2 in equilibrium. Player 2
must best-respond to every history w ∈W , which implies that U2(a2, b21, c212|w)must be maximized
14Picking up on our remarks in section 3, these simplifications fit into the general framework by assuming
that both players move in both periods, i.e. after all histories, but their action sets are singletons whenever
they do actually not play. The set of histories is simplified correspondingly, by recording only actions that
arise from actual choice.
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for every w ∈W . Under (A2), we can substitute the updated belief bw21 = w for b21 in the equitable
payoff pie1(b21|w) and simplify notation to pie1(w) ≡ pie1(w|w). Observing that aw2 = a2, ∀w ∈ W , we
can analogously simplify to k21(e, w) ≡ p˜i1(w, e)− pie1(w). Since cw212 = c212, ∀w ∈W , the equitable
payoff pie2(c212|w) must be independent of w under (A2) and can be simplified to pie2(c212). This,
finally, makes it possible to simplify λ212(w, c212) ≡ p˜i2(c212(w), w)− pie2(c212).
Observe that, in condition (ii), maximization is over effort levels e ∈ E, so that aˆ2 on the
RHS is treated as fixed. Therefore, the kindness term λ212 is not affected by e.
We now specify further assumptions. First, we assume that both W and E are compact
subsets of R, denoted by [w,w] and [e, e] whenever convex. The payoff functions p˜ii are
assumed to be continuously differentiable on every open subset of their domain. The following
assumptions specify the economic substance of the game.
(A3) (i) p˜i1(w, e) is strictly decreasing in w and strictly increasing in e.
(ii) p˜i2(w, e) is strictly increasing in w.
(iii) For each w ∈ W , there is a unique effort level that maximizes p˜i2(e, w) on E.
Parts (i) and (ii) capture a conflict of interest with respect to the wage w. Also, player
1 always prefers a larger effort level of player 2. Part (iii) is less strict: it allows for the
possibility that player 2 himself finds some effort materially desirable, as will be the case in
the following moral hazard application for positive incentive wages. For the rest of the paper
we will assume that assumptions (A1) to (A3) hold, without further mention. We conclude
this section by introducing two main examples for our setup.
Example 1: Gift Exchange.
In a gift exchange game, W = [0, w], E = [0, e], p˜i1(w, e) = e − w and p˜i2(e, w) = v(w) − e
for some continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave function v.
Example 2: Moral Hazard.
(a) Assume player 2 (the agent) chooses an unobservable effort level from E = [0, 1], which
is interpreted as the probability of completing a project successfully. The success of the
project is observable, with project payoffs V > 0 in case of success and zero otherwise.
Player 1 (the principal) offers a wage (or bonus) from W = [0, V ] to be paid in case
of success. Hence expected payoffs are p˜i1(w, e) = e(V − w) and p˜i2(e, w) = ew − d(e),
where d is a strictly increasing and strictly convex effort cost function.15
15Strictly speaking, these payoff functions do not satisfy assumption (A3), because for e = 0, p˜i1 is only
weakly decreasing and p˜i2 is only weakly increasing in w. For w = V , p˜i1 is only weakly increasing in e. None
of this, however, will constitute a problem in the following.
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(b) Several insights can already be gained in a binary version of the model, where E =
{0, p} for some p ∈ (0, 1).16
In the following section, we will present general results for the class of action-reaction
games. We return to the above examples in Section 6.
5.2 Equilibrium Inefficiency
First we want to examine whether intention-based social preferences foster the emergence
of materially Pareto efficient outcomes as in the models discussed in Section 2. Benjamin
(2010) distinguishes between material and utility efficiency, where the latter also takes into
account utility from social comparisons. With intention-based preferences, the concept of
overall utility efficiency, which includes the psychological utility component, is problematic.
Knowing the outcome of an interaction is not sufficient to derive psychological utility, because
it depends on the way the outcome was achieved. Hence we cannot derive a utility Pareto
frontier a priori, and then compare equilibrium outcomes to this frontier. Instead, we would
have to define a class of admissible games and define utility efficiency with respect to this
class. Bierbrauer and Netzer (2011) follow this approach in a general mechanism design
framework with intention-based social preferences. Due to the complexity of the problem,
here we refrain from analyzing utility Pareto efficiency and focus on material efficiency only,
remaining within the standard Rotten Kid framework.
Under assumption (A3)(iii), player 2 has a unique material best-response to any wage
w. Then, let a˜2 denote the best-response function defined by a˜2(w) = argmaxe∈E p˜i2(e, w),
∀w ∈W . As an initial step, we are going to show under which conditions player 2 does indeed
deviate from his material best reply to punish player 1 for being unkind in equilibrium.17
Lemma 2. In any IE (aˆ1, aˆ2) it holds that aˆ2(aˆ1) ≤ a˜2(aˆ1), with strict inequality if |ΠE2 (aˆ2)| ≥
2 and a˜2(aˆ1) ∈ intE.
Proof. Fix any IE (aˆ1, aˆ2). By Lemma 1,
aˆ2(aˆ1) ∈ argmax
e∈E
p˜i2(e, aˆ1) + yF (p˜i1(aˆ1, e)− pie1(aˆ1), λ), (2)
where λ = λ212(aˆ1, aˆ2) is independent of e and satisfies λ ≤ 0 according to Proposition 1, with
strict inequality if |ΠE2 (aˆ2)| ≥ 2. Also, a˜2(aˆ1) by definition maximizes p˜i2(e, aˆ1), the first term in
(2). Then, if λ = 0, we must have aˆ2(aˆ1) = a˜2(aˆ1), because F (k21, 0) is independent of k21, so that
16Again, assumption (A3)(iii) is not exactly satisfied in the binary model, because at wage w = (d(p) −
d(0))/p player 2 will be indifferent between the effort levels.
17The expression ΠE2 (aˆ2) stands short for ΠE2 (aˆ2|∅) in the following lemma.
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the reciprocity term can be omitted in (2). If λ < 0, the reciprocity term yF (p˜i1(aˆ1, e)− pie1(aˆ1), λ)
is strictly decreasing in e, which immediately implies aˆ2(aˆ1) ≤ a˜2(aˆ1). If a˜2(aˆ1) ∈ intE, then
a˜2(aˆ1) satisfies the necessary first order condition ∂p˜i2(a˜2(aˆ1), aˆ1)/∂e = 0, so that the objective (2)
is strictly decreasing in e at e = a˜2(aˆ1), implying aˆ2(aˆ1) < a˜2(aˆ1).
The lemma states that player 2 responds to the IE wage aˆ1 with weakly less effort than
would be optimal from a purely materialistic perspective. Whenever |ΠE2 (aˆ2)| ≥ 2, so that
player 1 is strictly unkind in equilibrium (see Proposition 1), and the materially optimal
effort level is not a corner solution, then the equilibrium effort is strictly lower.18 Since
player 1 suffers from reduced effort, this is equivalent to saying that player 2 punishes player
1 at an own material cost. From this argument we obtain the following immediate corollary.
Corollary 1. Any IE (aˆ1, aˆ2) with |ΠE2 (aˆ2)| ≥ 2 and a˜2(aˆ1) ∈ intE is materially Pareto
inefficient.
So whenever there are indeed conflicts of interest (|ΠE2 (aˆ2)| ≥ 2) and punishment is viable
(a˜2(aˆ1) ∈ intE), there is no hope to obtain an efficiency result in the spirit of the Rotten
Kid Theorem for the case of intention-based social preferences.
5.3 The Materialistic Player Suffers
From now on, we want to compare the outcome of IE (when player 2 is reciprocal) to that of
subgame-perfect equilibria (SPE) when both players are materialistic. For y1 = y2 = 0 our
definition of IE becomes the standard SPE definition, as is obvious from Lemma 1. We will
still use the different terms IE and SPE to avoid confusion. In any SPE, player 2 must clearly
play the strategy a˜2. Player 1 could still have more than one best reply a˜1, making multiple
SPE possible. We can now use the insights from Lemma 2 to compare the materialistic
player’s payoff in SPE and IE.
Proposition 2. For any SPE (a˜1, a˜2) and IE (aˆ1, aˆ2) it holds that pi1(aˆ1, aˆ2) ≤ pi1(a˜1, a˜2),
with strict inequality if aˆ2(aˆ1) < a˜2(aˆ1).
Proof. We have that pi1(aˆ1, aˆ2) = p˜i1(aˆ1, aˆ2(aˆ1)) ≤ p˜i1(aˆ1, a˜2(aˆ1)) = pi1(aˆ1, a˜2), because aˆ2(aˆ1) ≤
a˜2(aˆ1) according to Lemma 2 and because p˜i1 is increasing in e. The inequality is strict whenever
aˆ2(aˆ1) < a˜2(aˆ1). To obtain a contradiction, first assume pi1(a˜1, a˜2) < pi1(aˆ1, aˆ2). Together with the
above inequality this implies pi1(a˜1, a˜2) < pi1(aˆ1, a˜2), which contradicts a˜1 ∈ argmaxw∈W pi1(w, a˜2)
and hence that (a˜1, a˜2) is an SPE. If aˆ2(aˆ1) < a˜2(aˆ1), we obtain an analogous contradiction under
the assumption that pi1(a˜1, a˜2) ≤ pi1(aˆ1, aˆ2).
18The qualification that a˜2(aˆ1) must be an interior solution is necessary (i) to insure that reducing effort
below a˜2(aˆ1) is actually possible, and (ii) because aˆ2(aˆ1) might remain an upper corner solution if a˜2(aˆ1) is
one.
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Proposition 2 shows that the materialistic player does not profit from facing an opponent
who is reciprocal. His equilibrium payoff in any IE must necessarily be weakly smaller than
in any SPE, and strictly so whenever punishment actually takes place in the IE, which,
according to Lemma 2, will be the case except if there are common interests. This result
stands in stark contrast to results obtained with outcome-based preferences such as altruism.
For completeness, the following proposition confirms this claim within an altruism model that
is similar in generality to our intention-based model. We assume that player 1 still maximizes
material payoffs pi1(a1, a2). Player 2 is altruistic, maximizing pi2(a2, a1)+G(pi1(a1, a2)), where
G is an arbitrary but strictly increasing function of player 1’s payoff. We are interested in
subgame-perfect equilibria (a¯1, a¯2) of the action-reaction game with altruism, which we refer
to as altruism equilibria (AE).
Proposition 3. For any SPE (a˜1, a˜2) and AE (a¯1, a¯2) it holds that pi1(a˜1, a˜2) ≤ pi1(a¯1, a¯2),
with strict inequality if a˜2(a˜1) ∈ intE.
Proof. Arguing as in the proof of Lemma 2, it immediately follows that a˜2(a˜1) ≤ a¯2(a˜1), with strict
inequality if a˜2(a˜1) ∈ intE. But then pi1(a˜1, a˜2) = p˜i1(a˜1, a˜2(a˜1)) ≤ p˜i1(a˜1, a¯2(a˜1)) = pi1(a˜1, a¯2),
with strict inequality if a˜2(a˜1) < a¯2(a˜1). Since a¯1 ∈ argmaxa1∈A1 pi1(a1, a¯2) by definition of AE, we
obtain pi1(a˜1, a¯2) ≤ pi1(a¯1, a¯2), which completes the proof.
Propositions 2 and 3 together show that reciprocity and altruism have completely opposite
effects concerning player 1’s payoff. Depending on the specific application, this can have quite
important implications. For example, we could conclude that a profit-maximizing principal
should try to hire altruistic agents but stay away from reciprocators, because he can exploit
the social preferences of the first but not those of the latter.
5.4 Equilibrium Wages and Efforts
We now examine how reciprocity affects the equilibrium actions. To do so, we invoke some
additional conditions. The upshot of the analysis will be that reciprocity typically has a
positive effect on wages and a more ambiguous effect on efforts.
Our analysis in the following will be based on the standard psychological utility score
F (kij, λiji) = kij ·λiji. Player 2’s optimality condition from Lemma 1 thus becomes aˆ2(w) ∈
argmaxe∈E p˜i2(e, w) + y · (p˜i1(w, e)− pie1(w)) · λ212(w, aˆ2) for all w ∈ W . We will also assume
convexity of both W and E, i.e. W = [w,w] and E = [e, e]. Second, some additional but
standard assumptions on payoff functions will be used, which are satisfied in both Example
1 (gift-exchange) and Example 2 (moral hazard).
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(A4) (i) p˜i1(w, e) is submodular on W × E.
(ii) p˜i2(e, w) is supermodular on E ×W .
(iii) p˜i1(w, e) is (weakly) concave in e.
The following proposition again compares IE to SPE. For sake of clarity, it applies only
to the simplified case when there is a unique SPE (a˜1, a˜2), i.e. a unique value a˜1 ∈ W that
maximizes p˜i1(w, a˜2(w)).19 The proposition does, however, not require IE to be unique.
Proposition 4. Suppose that (A3) and (A4) hold. Then a˜1 ≤ aˆ1 holds for any IE (aˆ1, aˆ2)
in which ∆(w) ≡ a˜2(w)− aˆ2(w) is weakly decreasing in w on [w, a˜1] or [aˆ1, w] (or both).
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
The proposition applies to all those IE in which the punishment∆(w) is weakly decreasing
over a suitable range of wages. In a sense, these are equilibria that preserve some properties
of the SPE, namely that increasing the wage increases player 2’s payoffs, hence reduces
unkindness, and leads player 2 to punish less. We will show in Section 6 that, in several
standard applications, any equilibrium exhibits this property.
To grasp the intuition for the result, focus on the condition that ∆(w) is decreasing on
[w, a˜1] and observe that there are three effects of reciprocity on equilibrium wages, under
the assumptions of the proposition. First, we already know that player 2 responds with
lower effort (than materially optimal) to the equilibrium wage and, in fact, to any unkind
wage offer. Because player 1 is expecting lower effort, he wants to give higher wages by
submodularity (A4)(i). The second effect is more subtle: because p˜i1 is concave in efforts by
(A4)(iii), a lower value of effort makes it more attractive for player 1 to induce more effort
by further increasing his wage offer. Finally, consider the third effect: the assumption that
∆(w) is decreasing in the range [w, a˜1] implies that for all wages smaller than the SPE wage
a˜1, the wage-sensitivity of effort is larger in the IE than in the SPE. This again strengthens
player 1’s incentive to increase wages.
The proposition thus tells us that we can indeed expect reciprocity to have a positive
impact on the level of transfers from player 1 to player 2, as in the standard rotten kid model
or other previously discussed models with outcome-based social preferences. In our model,
the reason for such increased transfers is player 1’s attempt to reduce punishment by player
2, rather than the hope to trigger a benevolent gift in return. Thus it needs to be pointed out
that, because both outcome- and intention-based models have some predictions in common
(i.e. higher transfers than in the SPE), the empirical occurrence of such phenomena does
not yet lend support to purely outcome-based models.
19The result is readily generalizable to allow for multiple SPE, with its conclusion becoming a comparison
between largest and/or smallest wages across equilibria.
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The discussion so far suggests an ambiguous relation between reciprocity and effort. On
the one hand, reciprocity considerations add reason why agents react more positively to
higher wages, thus making it less costly for the principal to induce higher efforts. On the
other hand, starting from any given effort level, higher effort is also less beneficial for the
principal: In regions with punishment, inducing any effort level requires higher wages in IE
than in SPE, which by submodularity of the principal’s objective function means that the
profit increase resulting from higher effort is smaller.
6 Examples
6.1 Gift Exchange
Gift exchange games have been analyzed theoretically and experimentally (see for example
Falk and Fischbacher (2006) and the discussion therein). Therefore, we briefly examine the
implications of one-sided reciprocity in our gift exchange game as a starting point. Assuming
an interior solution, the efficient gift w∗ ∈ (0, w¯) is characterized by the condition v′(w∗) = 1.
We also immediately obtain a˜2(w) = 0 for all w, which implies that there is a unique SPE
(a˜1, a˜2) = (0, a˜2) where no gift is given and no transfer is paid. An analogous statement
holds for IE.
Proposition 5. In the gift exchange game, any IE (aˆ1, aˆ2) satisfies aˆ1 = 0 and aˆ2(aˆ1) = 0.
Proof. Lemma 2 implies aˆ2(aˆ1) ≤ a˜2(aˆ1) = 0, so that aˆ2(aˆ1) = 0 because aˆ2(aˆ1) ∈ [0, e¯].
Then, if aˆ1 > 0, we have p˜i1(aˆ1, aˆ2) = 0− aˆ1 < 0 ≤ aˆ2(0)− 0 = p˜i1(0, aˆ2), a contradiction.
Proposition 5 tells us that intention-based preferences, in contrast to outcome-based
altruism, do not help to solve the inefficiency problem in the simple gift exchange game.
Falk and Fischbacher (2006, p. 305) present a result according to which gift and transfer are
strictly positive even if only player 2 has social preferences.20 In their model, outcome- and
intention-based components are intertwined in the definition of social preferences. From the
perspective of our model, we would argue that any deviation from the SPE must be due to
the outcome-based component.
20Falk and Fischbacher (2006) use the slightly different material payoff functions p˜i1(w, e) = ve − w and
p˜i2(e, w) = w − αe2.
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6.2 Moral Hazard
6.2.1 The Binary Model
We now turn to the richer moral hazard game, and first examine its binary version in greater
detail. Despite its simplicity, this model yields a variety of interesting insights.
Without loss of generality, we normalize d(0) = 0 and write d(p) = d > 0. Furthermore,
we assume that pV > d, which implies that the high effort e = p is the efficient action. For
the reciprocity part of preferences we use the standard functional form F (kij, λiji) = kijλiji.
We calculate the equitable payoff piei (ai) as the mean between the largest and smallest payoff
of player i within the efficient set ΠEi (ai), in line with previous models.21 Formally, let
pili(ai) = inf {pii|(pii, pij) ∈ ΠEi (ai)} and pihi (ai) = sup {pii|(pii, pij) ∈ ΠEi (ai)}, and define
piei (ai) = (pi
l
i(ai) + pi
h
i (ai))/2.
The binary game has a unique SPE (a˜1, a˜2) in which a˜2 is of a cut-off form: for any
w < d/p we must have a˜2(w) = 0, while a˜2(w) = p for all d/p ≤ w.22 Player 1 then pays
a wage of a˜1 = d/p and player 2 supplies effort. We can compare this outcome with the
outcomes of IE, which are characterized in the following proposition.
Proposition 6. Consider the binary moral hazard game with pV > d. There exist two values
wl and wh with d/p < wl < wh < V , such that
(i) any IE (aˆ1, aˆ2) satisfies aˆ1 ∈ [wl, wh] and aˆ2(aˆ1) = p, and
(ii) for any wˆ ∈ [wl, wh] there exists an IE (aˆ1, aˆ2) with aˆ1 = wˆ and aˆ2(aˆ1) = p.
Proof. See Appendix, Section A.3.
According to part (i) of the proposition, the wage paid in any IE must be from the
interval [wl, wh], and it actually induces the high effort. Conversely, part (ii) tells us that
there is such an IE for any wage wˆ ∈ [wl, wh]. The equilibria we construct to prove the
second claim are of the same cut-off form as the SPE: player 2 supplies effort only for wages
w ≥ wˆ. It is worth pointing out, however, that not all IE are necessarily cut-off equilibria.
Player 2 could supply effort at wage wˆ but not at some higher wage w′. If player 1, who
anticipates this, actually offers wage w′, he must be considered especially unkind because he
intends to induce zero effort and give player 2 a payoff of zero. This can make it optimal from
player 2’s perspective to punish player 1 by indeed supplying no effort.23 Such equilibria are
21As argued before, we can omit conditioning on the history in our two-stage action-reaction game.
22At a wage of d/p, player 2 is indifferent between both effort levels. An equilibrium with a˜2(d/p) =
0 cannot exist, however, because a best-response of player 2 would not exist for such a strategy. This,
essentially, is the reason why the violations of Assumption A(3) that we discussed earlier are innocuous.
23Artifacts like this have already been observed by Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher (2008, p. 294f).
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rather counterintuitive, and we want to emphasize that no such construction is used to prove
statement (ii) in Proposition 6.
The proposition illustrates some of our general results from Sections 4 and 5. Consider
any IE (aˆ1, aˆ2), where aˆ1 ∈ [wl, wh] must hold according to statement (i). Then, as shown in
the proof of the proposition, player 2’s (correct) belief about player 1’s equilibrium kindness
is given by λ212(aˆ1, aˆ2) = −(p/2)(V − aˆ1), which is strictly negative even in the IE with
largest possible equilibrium wage wh < V . That is what Proposition 1 predicts. On the
other hand, even the lowest possible equilibrium wage wl is still larger than d/p, i.e. the
wage paid in the unique SPE. These two facts together are rather surprising: player 1 pays a
higher wage in any IE than in the SPE, but this does not imply he is considered kind: after
all, player 1 is still a rotten kid with bad intentions.
Player 2 is faced with the following trade-off. For wages d/p ≤ w, supplying the high
effort e = p is the unique action that induces a Pareto efficient payoff pair. This implies that
supplying effort is not a kind action from point of view of player 2, but it is simply neutral
(k21(p, w) = 0). Strictly positive kindness would require the sacrifice of own payoffs in favor
of player 1. Then, since F (kij, λiji) = kijλiji, the reciprocity term is irrelevant for player 2’s
evaluation of high effort, so that only material payoffs matter for him. On the other hand,
if he decides to supply no effort (e = 0), his material payoffs are zero and only psychological
utility matters. Hence, to induce effort, player 1 needs to make effort sufficiently attrac-
tive from a purely material perspective, relative to the psychologically appealing option of
punishment. Higher wages help on both sides: they make effort materially more reward-
ing, and they reduce player 1’s potential payoff and therefore decrease player 2’s scope for
punishment.24
The fact that the high effort e = p is supplied both in the SPE and in any IE is also
of interest. First, it makes it possible to compare material equilibrium payoffs simply by
comparing equilibrium wages. Proposition 6 therefore confirms Proposition 2’s prediction
that player 1 is worse off in any IE then in the SPE. Analogously, player 2 is strictly better
off. On the other hand, both the SPE and all IE are materially Pareto efficient due to high
effort. The reason that this is true for IE is, of course, the (artificial) restriction to binary
actions, which implies that a˜2(aˆ1) /∈ intE and makes Corollary 1 inapplicable. We will
return to this issue in the next subsection when discussing a richer moral hazard model.
Finally, we can examine the boundary values wl and wh more closely. As shown in the
24We would also want to point out that a˜1 ≤ aˆ1 for any IE also follows from our general Proposition 4.
The punishment function ∆(w) = a˜2(w) − aˆ2(w) is constant and equal to zero for all wages w ∈ [0, d/p],
which makes the proposition applicable.
19
proof of Proposition 6, they are implicitly defined by
y
[
(p/2)(V − wl)] = pwl − d
p(V − wl) , and (3)
y
[
(p/2)(V + wh)− d] = pwh − d
p(V − wh) . (4)
We can explicitly write them as functions of the parameters y, V and d and derive compar-
ative static effects.
Proposition 7. The values wl(y, V, d) and wh(y, V, d) are strictly increasing in y, V and d,
with limy→∞wl(y, V, d) = limy→∞wh(y, V, d) = V .
Proof. See Appendix, Section A.4.
The boundary values are strictly increasing in all three parameters. For the effort cost
d, this effect is standard: If supplying effort becomes more expensive, player 2 demands a
higher wage, i.e. both the largest and the smallest equilibrium wage increases. The same
comparative statics effect holds for the SPE wage a˜1. The SPE wage is independent of
V , however: If player 2 cares only for own material payoffs, the surplus left to player 1 is
irrelevant in his effort decision. This is no longer the case with intention-based preferences.
For a given wage, increasing the project payoff V makes the option of punishment more
attractive, because player 2 can deprive player 1 of higher payoffs by not supplying effort. In
this sense, a larger project value V implies a larger potential for sabotage, and the reciprocal
player wants to be compensated for not using this option.
This finding could again have interesting implications for job design. On the one hand
we should expect jobs with more responsibility to be paid better, even if they require exactly
the same skills. On the other hand, employers could benefit from systematically structuring
jobs so as to minimize potential for sabotage, even if destructive behavior is never observed
in equilibrium.
The positive effect of the degree of reciprocity y on wl and wh is now also obvious. As
psychological payoffs become more important, larger material payoffs are required to still
supply effort to the unkind player 1. More interesting is the statement that, as y →∞, both
wl and wh converge to V . This implies that player 2’s material payoffs become larger and he
eventually reaps the complete gains from trade as he cares less and less for material payoffs.
6.2.2 A Continuous Model
We now modify the principal-agent example to make the following two points. First, we
show the robustness of the key insights from the binary model. Second, in the new example
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reciprocity not only has distributional effects. Instead, efforts and hence efficiency will be
affected positively compared to the SPE, while material Pareto efficiency is at least not
generally attainable.
We modify the previous example by assuming that E = [0, 1] and d(e) = e2, which
results in monetary payoffs p˜i1 (w, e) = e (V − w) and p˜i2 (e, w) = ew − e2. Analogous to the
assumption pV > d in the previous section, we will assume V > 2 which implies that full
effort e = 1 is efficient. Then it is immediate to show that a˜2(w) = min{w/2, 1} is player 2’s
material best response, and player 1 will offer the wage a˜1 = min{V/2, 2} in the (unique)
SPE. We are now first interested whether there are still IE (aˆ1, aˆ2) of the cut-off form, i.e.
equilibria where
aˆ2(w) =
{
1 if wˆ ≤ w,
0 if w < wˆ,
for some wˆ ∈ [0, V ], and aˆ1 = wˆ. Such equilibria are interesting because they are materially
Pareto efficient.
Proposition 8. Consider the continuous moral hazard game with V > 2 and d(e) = e2.
(i) IE of the cut-off form exist if and only if
y ≥ δ(V ) ≡ 2
(V − 1)3/2 − (V − 1) . (5)
(ii) If (5) is satisfied, then there exist two values wl and wh with 2 < wl ≤ wh < V such that
a cut-off profile is an IE if and only if wˆ ∈ [wl, wh].
Proof. See Appendix, Section A.5.
Condition (5) can be used to describe the parameter region in (V, y)-space for which
cut-off equilibria exist (see Figure 1). High values of V and y (above the downward sloping
line) are conducive to existence. As the size of the surplus grows (V becomes sufficiently
large), small levels of reciprocity suffice to guarantee existence. Intuitively, cut-off equilibria
need a sufficiently strong reciprocity effect for existence, to render credible the threat of
supplying zero effort for small wages. As argued before, this is the case if either y or V are
large enough.
The boundaries wl and wh described in statement (ii) are characterized by conditions
similar to those in the binary moral hazard model (see equations (16) and (17) in Appendix
A.5), and they exhibit the same properties as those described in Proposition 7. Specifically,
as y → ∞, they converge to V . Since a˜1 ≤ 2 but 2 < wl ≤ wˆ = aˆ1 holds, we again have
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Figure 1: Existence of Cut-off Equilibria
that the wage in any cut-off IE is larger than the SPE wage.25 An example for the case
where V = 3 is given in Figure 2. According to (5), cut-off equilibria then exist whenever
y ≥ 1/(√2 − 1) ≈ 2.41. The first equilibrium that emerges (for y = 1/(√2 − 1)) has the
cutoff wˆ = 1/(
√
2 − 1). Several equilibria exist for larger values of y, but both the largest
and the smallest equilibrium are strictly increasing, their cut-offs are larger than a˜1 = 1.5,
and they converge towards a situation where the agent obtains the entire project payoff.
Equilibria with the cut-off property are efficient because they induce the high effort. For
V < 4, they share this property with the SPE. However, for V < 4 so that a˜1 < 2 and
a˜2(a˜1) < 1, the effort in any cut-off IE is strictly larger than in the SPE. In fact, the efficient
effort is chosen in any such IE. Note however that this requires a relatively strong concern
for reciprocity. At V = 4 the existence condition (5) becomes y ≥ 1/(√27 − 3) ≈ 0.91.
Hence whenever the IE has the potential to outperform the SPE (V < 4), this still requires
player 2 to put about at least equal weights on material and on psychological payoffs.
The quadratic model also has additional equilibria that are not of the cut-off form. The
goal for the remainder of the section will be to illustrate such equilibria and discuss interesting
properties. We should point out, however, that we do not attempt a complete equilibrium
analysis, but construct equilibria as follows.26 First, given some second-order belief c212,
player 2’s optimization yields a unique best effort response to any offered wage. The best
response of player 1 to this best-response function can then also be determined. Under
the (potentially restrictive) assumption that player 2’s material payoff is increasing in the
25To apply Proposition 4, observe that ∆(w) is constant on [aˆ1, w] in any cut-off IE, because a˜1(w) =
aˆ1(w) = 1 in this region.
26The details can be found in Appendix A.6.
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Figure 2: Cut-off Boundaries
wage in equilibrium, his equitable payoff can then be calculated as the average between his
equilibrium payoff and the payoff obtained for wage w = V . Then, the fixed point condition
aˆ2 = c212 can be invoked to determine IE. It can now be shown that, as y increases from
0, we pass through the following equilibrium regions (see Table 1 for the numerical results
when V = 3).
(i) For very low values of y (e.g., y = 0.1), the reaction function of player 2 is zero up
to some threshold after which it becomes positive and is strictly increasing. Eventu-
ally, a point where the agent supplies full effort is reached. The reaction function is
continuous, and the offered equilibrium wage is too low to induce full effort.
(ii) For larger values of y the equilibrium has similar properties except that, at the threshold
below which the reaction function is zero, there is an upward jump to an effort level
between 0 and 1. As long as y is not too large (e.g., y = 1), player 1 will not find it
optimal to induce full effort. For higher values (y ≥ 1.5), player 1 pays an equilibrium
wage that induces full effort.
Equilibria of the described type become increasingly similar to cut-off equilibria as y
increases, and they cease to exist if y is larger than some critical value (between 8 and 9 if
V = 3). Figure 3 illustrates the equilibrium strategies of player 2 for different values of y.
Hence, there is a parameter region where the last type of equilibrium coexists with cut-off
equilibria. Several other observations are worth mentioning:
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Figure 3: Other Equilibria
y 0 1 1.5 2 5 7 9
Type O O O O O+C O+C C
Lowest wage 1.5 2.22 2.33 2.38 2.54 2.59 2.63
Highest wage 1.5 2.22 2.33 2.38 2.71 2.79 2.84
Effort 0.75 0.95 1 1 1 1 1
pi1 1.13 0.75 0.67 0.62 0.46 0.41 0.37
pi2 0.56 1.21 1.33 1.38 1.54 1.59 1.63
Table 1: Numerical Results. C = cut-off equilibrium, O = other equilibrium.
(i) Where cut-off equilibria co-exist with the above derived equilibrium, the wage in the
latter corresponds to the lowest wage in a cut-off equilibrium.
(ii) The relation between y and both the lowest and the highest equilibrium wage is mono-
tone: As the reciprocity parameter increases, so does the equilibrium wage and the
equilibrium effort.
(iii) The material payoff of player 1 decreases with reciprocity, while the material payoff of
player 2 increases with reciprocity.
(iv) As y approaches infinity, the equilibrium wage approaches V , so that the agent receives
the entire surplus.
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6.2.3 A General Limit Result
We conclude the moral hazard example by providing a general limiting result for the case
when y → ∞. It applies to the continuous moral hazard model for any differentiable (and
strictly increasing and convex) effort cost function d(e), provided that V > d′(0), i.e. that
some effort provision is efficient. Let A (y) denote the set of IE for reciprocity parameter
y, and assume A (y) 6= ∅ for all y ∈ R+. Then, let a∗ : R+ → A1 × A2 be an arbitrary
equilibrium selection function, i.e. a∗(y) = (a∗1(y), a∗2(y)) ∈ A (y) for all y ∈ R+. We denote
the value of a∗2(y) at a wage w by a∗2(y)(w).
Proposition 9. Consider the continuous moral hazard game where d(e) is differentiable and
V > d′(0). Then any equilibrium selection function a∗ satisfies limy→∞ a∗1(y) = V .
Proof. See Appendix, Section A.7.
Proposition 9 establishes in general what the previous examples have illustrated: as
player 2’s concern for material payoffs becomes negligible relative to psychological payoffs,
he eventually reaps the entire gains from trade, i.e. the equilibrium wage converges to the
full project payoff V . This result is perfectly robust, in the sense that it holds for every
conceivable equilibrium selection.
7 Discussion
Our model with one-sided reciprocity is not supposed to deliver a comprehensive picture of
bilateral interactions with social preferences. First, many interactions (e.g. among experi-
ment participants as in Charness 2004 or Dhaene and Bouckaert 2010) will naturally involve
social preferences on both sides. As Rabin (1993) has already shown, positive kindness is
then compatible with equilibrium. Other interactions, such as between a profit-maximizing
firm and an employee, are more in line with our setup. Second, and more importantly, sub-
stantial evidence for the simultaneous presence of both intention- and outcome-based social
preferences has been accumulated by now (e.g. Andreoni et al. 2002, Falk et al. 2003, Falk
et al. 2008). Still, we believe that our approach is valuable for at least three reasons.
1. We have chosen to focus on intention-based preferences for conceptual clarity. As
a result, we have been able to show that existing results for purely outcome-based
preferences are changed considerably. Our approach makes it possible to isolate the
effects of intention-based preferences, which would be hard if not impossible in a model
that combines different types of social preferences.
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2. We have clarified the role of the reference point against which kindness is measured.
Our general result rests on the assumption of an arbitrary interior reference point. It
therefore implies that positive equilibrium kindness necessarily requires the use of a
reference point on the boundary of the efficiency frontier.
3. While we described pii as player i’s material payoff throughout the paper, a more
appropriate name would actually be outcome-based payoff. Assuming that pii includes
nonpecuniary utility components such us altruism or envy is compatible with our model
as long as they can be derived from outcomes only. Hence many of the effects that we
have derived will still exist in addition to possible outcome-based effects. In particular,
this holds for the bad intentions result, which requires essentially no assumptions on
the payoff functions pii.
The empirical evidence on positive and negative kindness is mixed (see for instance
the discussion in Dohmen et al. 2009). Related to our approach, Utikal and Fischbacher
(2009) report on an experiment where individuals were asked to evaluate the intentions
behind actions of a profit-maximizing firm: one treatment involved positive and one negative
externalities on a third party. They find that, when the firm is in a dominant position and
positive externalities are small, positive externalities are perceived as unintentional while
negative externalities are perceived as fully intentional, broadly in line with our results.
The effect is no longer present when the firm has small economic status, and the result is
reversed if the positive externalities become sufficiently large. The overall approach of Utikal
and Fischbacher (2009) is, however, not fully comparable to our model, for example because
the person to judge and punish is not the one experiencing the externality.
Finally, we have already emphasized in Section 3 that our definition of equitable payoff
rests on an efficiency concept adopted from Rabin (1993) rather than Dufwenberg and Kirch-
steiger (2004). This is indeed crucial for our results. The concept of sequential reciprocity
equilibrium due to Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) would require to define ΠEi (ai|h) as
the payoff pairs achievable when player j 6= i can play any efficient strategy aj. A strategy
aj is efficient except if there exists another strategy a′j that always yields the same and
sometimes higher payoffs (to both players), where “always” refers to all histories and all
strategies of player i. With this concept, the set ΠEi (ai|h) would become substantially larger
and include payoff pairs that are in fact Pareto dominated when h and ai are fixed. As a
result, equilibrium kindness would become possible even with one-sided reciprocity. In the
binary moral hazard game, for instance, paying a wage below the agent’s threshold wˆ would
be efficient. Given the agent’s actual strategy, the resulting outcome is Pareto inefficient.
There are, however, non-equilibrium strategies of the agent for which the low wage would
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induce a Pareto efficient outcome, in which the principal would obtain very large payoffs.
Hence the principal could be considered kind when offering wˆ, even though he holds a correct
belief about the agent’s actual equilibrium strategy and in fact does not sacrifice own payoffs
in favor of the agent.
8 Conclusions
This paper has shown that, when materialistic and reciprocal players interact, both will
typically display unkind behavior in equilibrium. This result, which requires only weak as-
sumptions, stands in stark contrast to familiar findings that materialistic players (“rotten
kids”) benefit from outcome-based social preferences of others, such as altruism and inequity
aversion. We explore the implications of our general result in standard principal-agent games.
Compared to the subgame-perfect equilibrium, the intentions equilibrium usually displays
higher wages and higher efforts. While the reciprocal player obtains higher material payoffs
thanks to the higher wages even though he chooses higher efforts, the materialistic player
loses, because the higher effort does not compensate for higher wage costs. When reciprocity
concerns are sufficiently pronounced, the gains from trade may accrue fully to the recipro-
cal player. Thus, contrary to inequity aversion, reciprocity works towards a more unequal
distribution.
Our analysis has several applications. First, most directly, firms may not want to employ
reciprocal workers. Even compared to the alternative of purely materialistic workers, the
employers are typically worse off with reciprocal agents. Second, materialistic workers can
benefit from being perceived as reciprocators, in the sense that firms who are prepared to
employ them will pay higher wages than to materialistic agents. However, in view of the first
conclusion they must be concerned that firms may shy away from employing them in the first
place, so that the reputation of being a reciprocator is a mixed blessing, with opposing effects
before and after entering an interaction. These results might be interesting from perspective
of the literature on reputation, both economic (Kreps and Wilson 1982) and psychological
(Cohen and Nisbett 1994). Third, we obtain a rationale for paying higher wages to employees
with higher responsibility, as measured by the difference in payoffs that workers’ actions can
make. Suppose the worker has a strong potential for sabotage by choosing low effort, because
high effort may lead to a substantial increase in social surplus. Contrary to the corresponding
model with purely materialistic agents, our model predicts a higher wage.
While these implications follow more or less directly from our model, we are also confident
that suitable extensions can be used to obtain further interesting results on organizational
design (Englmaier and Leider 2011, von Siemens 2011). For instance, experimental obser-
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vations suggests that, if a principal gives the control rights for unpopular decisions to third
parties, he may benefit because he is perceived as less unkind than when he takes such
decisions himself (Bartling and Fischbacher 2011). It would be interesting to see whether
such behavior is consistent with our framework. Finally, extensions of our paper would
seem suitable to shed new light on the longstanding debate on the boundaries of the firm.
Nickerson and Zenger (2008) argue that larger firms might suffer from increased costs due
to social comparisons between employees. From our perspective, changes in the numbers of
employees working on related projects may affect their potential for sabotage and thus the
potential adverse consequences of reciprocal behavior.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Step 1. Consider any history h that is reached on the equilibrium path, i.e. that satisfies aˆhi = aˆi
for i = 1, 2. We then have that pii(aˆi, aˆj |h) = pii(aˆi, aˆj |∅) = pii(aˆi, aˆj), ΠEi (aˆi|h) = ΠEi (aˆi|∅) and
piei (aˆi|h) = piei (aˆi|∅) for i = 1, 2, i 6= j, the latter by (A2). Therefore, the following arguments for
h = ∅ apply unaltered to any history on the equilibrium path.
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Step 2. We now show that k12(aˆ1, aˆ2|∅) ≤ 0, with strict inequality if |ΠE2 (aˆ2|∅)| ≥ 2. To
obtain a contradiction, assume first that |ΠE2 (aˆ2|∅)| ≥ 2 but k12(aˆ1, aˆ2|∅) ≥ 0. There are now
two subcases. First, (pi1(aˆ1, aˆ2), pi2(aˆ2, aˆ1)) ∈ ΠE2 (aˆ2|∅) may hold. Then, under (A1), there exists
a strategy a′1 ∈ A1 such that (pi1(a′1, aˆ2), pi2(aˆ2, a′1)) ∈ ΠE2 (aˆ2|∅) and pi2(aˆ2, a′1) < pie2(aˆ2|∅) ≤
pi2(aˆ2, aˆ1), where the second inequality follows from the assumption that k12(aˆ1, aˆ2|∅) ≥ 0. Pareto
efficiency of the elements in ΠE2 (aˆ2|∅) then implies that pi1(a′1, aˆ2) > pi1(aˆ1, aˆ2), which contradicts
that aˆ1 ∈ argmaxa1∈A1 pi1(a1, aˆ2). Second, (pi1(aˆ1, aˆ2), pi2(aˆ2, aˆ1)) /∈ ΠE2 (aˆ2|∅) may hold. Then, all
(pi′1, pi′2) ∈ ΠE2 (aˆ2|∅) must satisfy pi′2 > pi2(aˆ2, aˆ1). Assume to the contrary that pi′2 ≤ pi2(aˆ2, aˆ1) for
some (pi′1, pi′2) ∈ ΠE2 (aˆ2|∅). Since aˆ1 ∈ argmaxa1∈A1 pi1(a1, aˆ2), pi′1 ≤ pi1(aˆ1, aˆ2) must also hold. But
then, if (pi′1, pi′2) ∈ ΠE2 (aˆ2|∅), (pi1(aˆ1, aˆ2), pi2(aˆ2, aˆ1)) ∈ ΠE2 (aˆ2|∅) must also hold, a contradiction.
Now we immediately obtain pi2(aˆ2, aˆ1) < pie2(aˆ2|∅) under (A1), and hence k12(aˆ1, aˆ2|∅) < 0.
Assume then that |ΠE2 (aˆ2|∅)| = 1 and denote ΠE2 (aˆ2|∅) = {(pi′1, pi′2)}, so that pie2(aˆ2|∅) = pi′2
under (A1). Then, unique Pareto efficiency of (pi′1, pi′2) implies that pi2(aˆ2, aˆ1) ≤ pi′2, which in turn
implies k12(aˆ1, aˆ2|∅) ≤ 0. This completes step 2.
Step 3. Now consider player 2. In any IE, we have that b21 = aˆ1 and c212 = aˆ2 according
to Definition 1, so that λ212(b21, c212|h) = k12(aˆ1, aˆ2|h) ≤ 0 at any history h ∈ H on the equi-
librium path, including h = ∅. Hence U2(a2, aˆ1, c212|∅) is (weakly) decreasing in pi1(aˆ1, a2|∅).
We can now go through the same cases as for player 1, repeating analogous arguments. First, if
|ΠE1 (aˆ1|∅)| ≥ 2 and (pi1(aˆ1, aˆ2), pi2(aˆ2, aˆ1)) ∈ ΠE1 (aˆ1|∅), we obtain a contradiction to weakly pos-
itive kindness because ∃a′2 ∈ A2 such that pi1(aˆ1, a′2) < pi1(aˆ1, aˆ2) and pi2(a′2, aˆ1) > pi2(aˆ2, aˆ1). If
(pi1(aˆ1, aˆ2), pi2(aˆ2, aˆ1)) /∈ ΠE1 (aˆ1|∅), on the other hand, all profiles (pi′1, pi′2) ∈ ΠE1 (aˆ1|∅) must satisfy
pi′1 > pi1(aˆ1, aˆ2). Otherwise, if pi′1 ≤ pi1(aˆ1, aˆ2) held for some (pi′1, pi′2) ∈ ΠE1 (aˆ1|∅), pi′2 > pi2(aˆ1, aˆ2)
would have to be true, because (pi′1, pi′2) is Pareto efficient but (pi1(aˆ1, aˆ2), pi2(aˆ2, aˆ1)) is not. Then,
player 2 would prefer the strategy inducing (pi′1, pi′2) over aˆ2. But then again pi1(aˆ1, aˆ2) < pie1(aˆ1|∅).
Finally, if |ΠE1 (aˆ1|∅)| = 1, it again follows immediately that k21(aˆ2, aˆ1|∅) ≤ 0.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 4
Step 1. First we show that aˆ2(a˜1) ≤ a˜2(a˜1) must hold. To obtain a contradiction, assume
aˆ2(a˜1) > a˜2(a˜1). Then, pi1(a˜1, a˜2) = p˜i1(a˜1, a˜2(a˜1)) < p˜i1(a˜1, aˆ2(a˜1)) under (A3)(i). Since aˆ1 ∈
argmaxw∈W p˜i1(w, aˆ2(w)) according to Lemma 1, p˜i1(a˜1, aˆ2(a˜1)) ≤ p˜i1(aˆ1, aˆ2(aˆ1)) = pi1(aˆ1, aˆ2) must
hold, which implies pi1(a˜1, a˜2) < pi1(aˆ1, aˆ2) and contradicts Proposition 2.
Step 2. To prove the proposition, we are going to show that, for any w ∈ [w, a˜1), it holds
that p˜i1(a˜1, a˜2(a˜1)) − p˜i1(w, a˜2(w)) ≤ p˜i1(a˜1, aˆ2(a˜1)) − p˜i1(w, aˆ2(w)). The LHS of this inequality is
strictly positive by definition of a˜1 as the unique maximizer of p˜i1(w, a˜2(w)). Then, if the inequality
holds, the RHS must also be strictly positive. But p˜i1(a˜1, aˆ2(a˜1))− p˜i1(aˆ1, aˆ2(aˆ1)) cannot be strictly
positive, again because aˆ1 maximizes p˜i1(w, aˆ2(w)). We then know that aˆ1 /∈ [w, a˜1), which is the
desired conclusion.
The above inequality can be rearranged to p˜i1(a˜1, a˜2(a˜1)) − p˜i1(a˜1, aˆ2(a˜1)) ≤ p˜i1(w, a˜2(w)) −
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p˜i1(w, aˆ2(w)). Now, p˜i1(a˜1, a˜2(a˜1)) − p˜i1(a˜1, aˆ2(a˜1)) ≤ p˜i1(w, a˜2(a˜1)) − p˜i1(w, aˆ2(a˜1)) holds due to
w < a˜1, aˆ2(a˜1) ≤ a˜2(a˜1) from step 1, and submodularity of p˜i1 (assumption (A4)(i)). Supermodular-
ity of p˜i2 (assumption (A4)(ii)) implies that a˜2(w) ≤ a˜2(a˜1). Then, concavity of p˜i1 in e (assumption
(A4)(iii)) implies that p˜i1(w, a˜2(a˜1))− p˜i1(w, aˆ2(a˜1)) ≤ p˜i1(w, a˜2(w))− p˜i1(w, aˆ2(a˜1)− a˜2(a˜1)+ a˜2(w)).
Now observe that aˆ2(w) ≤ aˆ2(a˜1) − a˜2(a˜1) + a˜2(w), which follows immediately from the fact
that ∆(w) is decreasing in w ∈ [w, a˜1]. Thus p˜i1(w, a˜2(w)) − p˜i1(w, aˆ2(a˜1) − a˜2(a˜1) + a˜2(w)) ≤
p˜i1(w, a˜2(w))−p˜i1(w, aˆ2(w)). Combining all these inequalities yields p˜i1(a˜1, a˜2(a˜1))−p˜i1(a˜1, aˆ2(a˜1)) ≤
p˜i1(w, a˜2(w))− p˜i1(w, aˆ2(w)), which is the desired result.
Step 3. The proof for the interval [aˆ1, w] is analogous.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 6
Statement (i). Fix any IE (aˆ1, aˆ2).
Step 1. We will first derive the kindness terms k21 = p˜i1(w, e) − pie1(w) for all w ∈ [0, V ]. For
w < d/p it holds that ΠE1 (w) = {(0, 0), (p(V −w), pw − d)}, because pw − d < 0 < p(V −w). This
implies pie1(w) = (p/2)(V − w) and
k21(e, w) =
{
(p/2)(V − w) if e = p,
−(p/2)(V − w) if e = 0.
For d/p ≤ w we have ΠE1 (w) = {(p(V − w), pw − d)}. This implies pie1(w) = p(V − w) and
k21(e, w) =
{
0 if e = p,
−p(V − w) if e = 0.
Step 2. We can now show that aˆ2(V ) = p must hold. Indeed, from the above results we have
k21(e, V ) = 0 for both e ∈ {0, p}. Hence aˆ2(V ) = a˜2(V ) = p according to Lemma 1.
Step 3. Next, we show that ∃w′ < V with aˆ2(w′) = p. To obtain a contradiction, assume
aˆ2(w) = 0 for all w ∈ [0, V ). Then ΠE2 (aˆ2) = {(pV − d, 0)}, pie2(aˆ2) = pV − d and
λ212(w, aˆ2) =
{
0 if w = V,
−(pV − d) if w < V.
Consider any wage w ∈ [d/p, V ). According to Lemma 1, optimality of effort aˆ2(w) = 0 requires
p˜i2(0, w) + yk21(0, w)λ212(w, aˆ2) ≥ p˜i2(p, w) + yk21(p, w)λ212(w, aˆ2). Using the above derived terms
this can be rearranged to
yp(V − w) ≥ pw − d
pV − d.
But as w → V , the LHS of this condition goes to zero while the RHS goes to 1, so it must be
violated for sufficiently large wages w < V , which precludes the possibility of (aˆ1, aˆ2) being an IE.
Step 4. Given aˆ2, let W0 = {w ∈W |aˆ2(w) = 0} and Wp = {w ∈W |aˆ2(w) = p}. We know from
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step 3 that |Wp| ≥ 2. Since any w ∈W0 induces material payoffs p˜i1(w, aˆ2(w)) = p˜i2(aˆ2(w), w) = 0,
while for w = V we have p˜i1(V, aˆ2(V )) = 0 and p˜i2(aˆ2(V ), V ) = pV −d > 0 according to step 2, wages
w ∈ W0 induce Pareto inefficient payoffs. For wages w ∈ Wp, p˜i1(w, aˆ2(w)) = p(V − w) is strictly
decreasing and p˜i2(aˆ2(w), w) = pw−d is strictly increasing in w, which implies ΠE2 (aˆ2) =Wp. From
Lemma 1 we can also conclude that aˆ1 = minWp, so that aˆ1 < V and aˆ2(aˆ1) = p. Player 2’s
equitable payoff can then be expressed as pie2(aˆ2) = (p/2)(V + aˆ1) − d, because w = aˆ1 yields his
smallest and w = V yields his largest among Pareto efficient payoffs. As for the kindness term λ212,
we obtain
λ212(w, aˆ2) =
{
pw − (p/2)(V + aˆ1) if w ∈Wp,
d− (p/2)(V + aˆ1) if w ∈W0.
Step 5. Since aˆ1 ∈Wp we have that λ212(aˆ1, aˆ2) = (p/2)(aˆ1−V ) < 0. This implies that d/p ≤ aˆ1
must be true, since otherwise, aˆ2(aˆ1) = p 6= 0 = argmaxe∈{0,p} p˜i2(e, aˆ1) + yk21(e, aˆ1)λ212(aˆ1, aˆ2),
for both material and reciprocity motives. Since aˆ1 = minWp, we obtain d/p ≤ w for all w ∈ Wp
as a corollary.
Step 6. For (aˆ1, aˆ2) to be an IE it needs to hold that p˜i2(p, w)+yk21(p, w)λ212(w, aˆ2) ≥ p˜i2(0, w)+
yk21(0, w)λ212(w, aˆ2) for all w ∈ Wp. Using the above derived expressions for the case d/p ≤ w,
this can be simplified to
y [(p/2)(V + aˆ1)− pw] ≤ pw − d
p(V − w) . (6)
Since the LHS of (6) is strictly decreasing in w and the RHS is strictly increasing, this is satisfied
∀w ∈Wp iff it is satisfied at aˆ1 = minWp:
y [(p/2)(V − aˆ1)] ≤ paˆ1 − d
p(V − aˆ1) . (7)
Since the LHS of (7) is decreasing and the RHS is increasing in aˆ1, condition (7) implicitly defines
a lower bound wl for aˆ1 given by
y
[
(p/2)(V − wl)
]
=
pwl − d
p(V − wl) , (8)
such that (aˆ1, aˆ2) can be an IE only if wl ≤ aˆ1. To see that d/p < wl, observe that the RHS of (8)
becomes zero if wl = d/p, while the LHS is still positive. As the LHS is decreasing and the RHS is
increasing in wl we must have d/p < wl.
Step 7. For (aˆ1, aˆ2) to be an IE, it also needs to hold that p˜i2(0, w) + yk21(0, w)λ212(w, aˆ2) ≥
p˜i2(p, w) + yk21(p, w)λ212(w, aˆ2) for all w ∈ W0. For w ∈ W0 with d/p ≤ w < aˆ1 (which exist since
d/p < wl ≤ aˆ1), this can be rearranged to
y [(p/2)(V + aˆ1)− d] ≥ pw − d
p(V − w) .
Since the RHS is continuous and increasing in w, this is satisfied for all d/p ≤ w < aˆ1 iff it is
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satisfied at aˆ1, i.e.
y [(p/2)(V + aˆ1)− d] ≥ paˆ1 − d
p(V − aˆ1) . (9)
Both the LHS and the RHS of (9) are increasing in aˆ1. We can calculate the derivative of the LHS
w.r.t. aˆ1 as (p/2)y and the derivative of the RHS as (V − d/p)/(V − aˆ1)2. The condition that
(p/2)y < (V − d/p)/(V − aˆ1)2 can be rearranged to
y [(p/2)(V − aˆ1)] < pV − d
p(V − aˆ1) ,
which is satisfied whenever (7) is satisfied. Thus (9) defines the upper bound wh by
y
[
(p/2)(V + wh)− d
]
=
pwh − d
p(V − wh) , (10)
and (aˆ1, aˆ2) is an IE only if aˆ1 ≤ wh. Arguments analogous to step 6 reveal that d/p < wh < V .
To show that wl < wh, it suffices to show that
y
[
(p/2)(V − wh)
]
< y
[
(p/2)(V + wh)− d
]
. (11)
If (11) holds and wh solves (10), then for wl = wh the LHS of (8) is smaller than the RHS of (8),
which implies the desired result wl < wh. But inequality (11) is equivalent to d/p < wh, which is
true.
Statement (ii). For any wˆ ∈ [wl, wh] we construct an IE (aˆ1, aˆ2) with aˆ1 = wˆ and the cut-off
strategy
aˆ2(w) =
{
p if wˆ ≤ w,
0 if w < wˆ
for player 2, so that aˆ2(aˆ1) = aˆ2(wˆ) = p.
Step 1. Given aˆ2, the fact that wˆ (uniquely) maximizes p˜i1(w, aˆ2(w)) as required by Lemma 1
is immediate.
Step 2. Since wl ≤ wˆ, the argument in step 6 for statement (i) immediately implies that
aˆ2(w) = p is indeed a best-response for player 2 to any w ∈Wp = [wˆ, V ].
Step 3. Analogously, the argument in step 7 above implies that aˆ2(w) = 0 is a best response
for player 2 to any w ∈ [d/p, wˆ). Since W0 = [0, wˆ), it only remains to be checked that aˆ2(w) = 0
is also a best response to wages w ∈ [0, d/p). But the corresponding payoff comparison can easily
be rearranged to (pw − d)/2 ≤ y which is always satisfied because pw − d < 0 in that range. Thus
whenever wˆ ∈ [wl, wh], the above defined cut-off profile (aˆ1, aˆ2) is an IE.
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A.4 Proof of Proposition 7
Step 1. Consider wl first. Equation (3) can be rearranged to
wl − (d/p)− (yp/2)(V − wl)2 = 0. (12)
Implicit differentiation of (12) yields
∂wl
∂y
=
(p/2)(V − wl)2
1 + yp(V − wl) > 0
due to wl < V . Next,
∂wl
∂V
=
yp(V − wl)
1 + yp(V − wl) > 0,
and
∂wl
∂d
=
1/p
1 + yp(V − wl) > 0.
Step 2. As for wh, (4) can be rearranged to
wh − (d/p)− (yp/2)(V + wh)(V − wh) + yd(V − wh) = 0. (13)
From (13) we obtain
∂wh
∂y
=
(V − wh) [(p/2)(V + wh)− d]
1 + y(pwh − d) > 0
because d/p < wh < V . Next,
∂wh
∂V
=
y(pV − d)
1 + y(pwh − d) > 0
and
∂wh
∂d
=
(1/p)− y(V − wh)
1 + y(pwh − d) . (14)
The condition that (14) is strictly positive can be rearranged to y < (1/p(V − wh)) and, by mul-
tiplying both sides with pwh − d, to y(pwh − d) < (pwh − d)/(p(V − wh)). In this expression, the
RHS (pwh − d)/(p(V −wh)) is equal to the RHS of (4), but the LHS y(pwh − d) is strictly smaller
than the LHS of (4), because wh < V . Since (4) holds as an equality, we can conclude ∂wh/∂d > 0.
Step 3. Rewrite (12) as
y
(p
2
)
=
wl − d/p
(V − wl)2 . (15)
As y → ∞, the LHS of (15) goes to infinity, and so must the RHS, immediately implying that
wl → V because d/p < wl < V . Since wl < wh < V , the same limit statement must hold for wh.
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A.5 Proof of Proposition 8
Step 1. As in the proof of Proposition 6, we first derive the kindness terms k21(e, w). Since
a˜2(w) = min{w/2, 1} maximizes player 2’s material payoffs p˜i2(e, w) = ew − e2, which are strictly
concave in e, we obtain ΠE1 (w) =
{(
e(V − w), ew − e2) |e ∈ [min{w/2, 1}, 1]}. The equitable payoff
when w ∈ [0, 2] is thus pie1(w) = (1/2)(V −w)((w/2)+ 1), and pie1(w) = V −w whenever w ∈ (2, V ].
We then obtain the kindness term
k21(e, w) =
 (V − w)(e− 1) if w ∈ (2, V ],(V − w)(e− (w/2)+12 ) if w ∈ [0, 2].
Step 2. Lemma 1 now implies that, in any IE (aˆ1, aˆ2), overall utility ew−e2+yk21(e, w)λ212(w, aˆ2)
must be maximized by e = aˆ2(w) for every w ∈ [0, V ]. It is easily verified that the objective is
strictly concave in e (for any fixed w). The first-order condition is identical for the cases w ∈ [0, 2]
and w ∈ (2, V ] and characterizes the following effort level:
e∗(w) =
w
2
+
yλ212(w, aˆ2)(V − w)
2
.
Concavity implies that aˆ2(w) = e∗(w) whenever e∗(w) ∈ [0, 1], and aˆ2(w) = 1 (= 0) whenever
e∗(w) > 1 (< 0).
Step 3. Now consider a cut-off profile (aˆ1, aˆ2) with cut-off value wˆ. Arguing as for Proposition
6, we obtain ΠE2 (aˆ2) = {(w − 1, V − w)|wˆ ≤ w} and pie2(aˆ2) = ((V + wˆ)/2)− 1. This implies
λ212(w, aˆ2) =
{
w − (V+wˆ2 ) if wˆ ≤ w,
1− (V+wˆ2 ) if w < wˆ.
Optimality of aˆ2(w) = 1 for all wˆ ≤ w now requires e∗(w) ≥ 1 for all those wages, i.e.
y
[(
V + wˆ
2
)
− w
]
≤ w − 2
V − w
after substitution of λ212 and some rearrangements. Arguing as for Proposition 6, this yields a lower
bound wl for wˆ, implicitly defined by
y
[(
V − wl
2
)]
=
wl − 2
V − wl . (16)
Analogously, the condition for aˆ2(w) = 0 to be optimal for all w ∈ [0, wˆ) yields an upper bound
given by
y
[(
V + wh
2
)
− 1
]
=
wh
V − wh . (17)
Step 5. The fact that 2 < wl < V and wh < V is shown as for Proposition 6. Thus is remains to
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be shown under which conditions wl ≤ wh holds, so that the requirements for equilibrium existence
can be met simultaneously.
Fix wh as defined in (17) and suppose we evaluate (16) at the value wh instead of wl. Then the
LHS of (16), (y/2)(V − wh), is (weakly) smaller than the RHS, (wh − 2)/(V − wh), if and only if
wl ≤ wh. Dividing the LHS of (17) by (y/2)(V −wh) and the RHS by (wh − 2)/(V −wh) we then
obtain the equivalent condition
V + wh − 2
V − wh ≤
wh
wh − 2 ,
which in turn is equivalent to 1 +
√
V − 1 ≤ wh. Hence wl ≤ wh if and only if 1 +√V − 1 ≤ wh.
Suppose first that wl ≤ wh, so that 1 +√V − 1 ≤ wh. (17) can be rearranged to
y =
2wh
(V − wh)(V + wh − 2) . (18)
Since the RHS of this expression is increasing in wh for values 1 < wh, we can replace wh by
1 +
√
V − 1 to obtain the inequality
y ≥ 2
[
1 +
√
V − 1][
(V − 1)−√V − 1] [(V − 1) +√V − 1] = 2(V − 1) [√V − 1− 1] ,
which is condition (5). Conversely, if (5) is satisfied, then 1+
√
V − 1 ≤ wh must hold, because the
RHS of (18) is too small at wh = 1 +
√
V − 1, but increasing. This implies wl ≤ wh.
A.6 Numerical Example
We search for equilibria that exhibit the properties that (i) the equilibrium effort is interior, aˆ2(aˆ1) ∈
(0, 1), and (ii) the monetary payoff of player 2 is increasing in wages.
Consider player 1. If he induces an interior effort level, he chooses the wage according to
aˆ′2 (w) (V − w)− aˆ2 (w) = 0, (19)
provided aˆ2 (w) is differentiable in the relevant region. Assuming that a solution of this equation
exists, denote it as wm and write em = aˆ2 (wm). If the monetary payoff of player 2 is increasing
in the wage, wm leads to the minimum payoff for player 2 among the Pareto-efficient choices given
aˆ2 (w): Any lower wage will make both players worse off, and any higher wage will make player 1
worse off. Also, aˆ2(V ) = 1must always hold, because k21(e, V ) as derived in the proof of Proposition
8 is independent of e, so that aˆ2(V ) = a˜2(V ). We thus obtain
pie2 (aˆ2) =
emwm − (em)2 + V − 1
2
. (20)
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Using the kindness terms derived in the proof of Proposition 8, we obtain the payoff of player 2 as
U2 (e, w, aˆ2) =
 ew − e
2 + y (V − w) (e− 1)
(
aˆ2(w)w − (aˆ2(w))2 − pie2 (aˆ2)
)
if w ∈ (2, V ]
ew − e2 + y (V − w)
(
e− (w/2)+12
)(
aˆ2(w)w − (aˆ2(w))2 − pie2 (aˆ2)
)
if w ∈ [0, 2]
.
(21)
The function U2(e, w, aˆ2) is strictly concave in e and yields the first order condition
∂U2
∂e
= w − 2e+ y (V − w)
(
aˆ2(w)w − (aˆ2(w))2 − pie2 (aˆ2)
)
= 0.
Using (20) and the fixed point condition e = aˆ2(w), we obtain
w − 2aˆ2(w) + y (V − w)
(
aˆ2(w)w − (aˆ2(w))2 −
(
emwm − (em)2 + V − 1
2
))
= 0. (22)
Then, by implicit differentiation we can determined the slope of aˆ2(w) as
aˆ′2(w) = −
y(aˆ2(w))2 − 12y − 12y (em)2 + 12V y + V yaˆ2(w)− 2ywaˆ2(w) + 12ywmem + 1
V yw − yw2 − 2V yaˆ2(w) + 2ywaˆ2(w)− 2 . (23)
If equilibrium wages and efforts are wm and em, then the following requirements need to be
fulfilled. First, (19) has to hold with aˆ′2(w) replaced by the right-hand side of (23) evaluated at
w = wm and aˆ2(wm) = em. Second, (22) has to hold for wm and em. These two requirements give
V − wm − 2em − ywm − 6y (em)2 + V y + 32ywm (em)
2+
1
2
ywmem + 3V yem +
1
2
V y (em)
2 − 3
2
V ywmem = 0. (24)
and
wm − 2em + y (V − wm)
(
emwm − (em)2 −
(
emwm − (em)2 + 2
2
))
= 0.
The last two equations can be used to calculate candidate equilibrium actions for given parameter
values, provided an interior solution exists. It remains to be checked that, along the reaction curve,
the equilibrium payoff of player 2 increases. This turns out to be true in the examples.
To derive aˆ2 at wage levels other than wm, one has to start from (22). Except for small values
of y, the curve described by this equation has no solution for low values of w. Thus a boundary
solution emerges. Because ∂U2/∂e < 0 and ∂2U2/∂e2 < 0, the boundary solution is aˆ2 (w) = 0.
To the immediate right of the critical wage level where a solution of (22) emerges, there is a region
where it is solved by two effort levels, only one of which is an original best response. At the critical
level, the reaction curve jumps upwards to this effort level. For higher wage levels, (22) yields a
solution larger than 1. At such wage levels, ∂U2/∂e > 0 and ∂2U2/∂e2 < 0 imply aˆ2 (w) = 1.
For y > 1.5 it turns out that the solution derived in the above fashion is no longer in the strategy
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space, because it would involve e > 1. Then one has to modify the above procedure by taking the
candidate effort level e = 1. Choosing w as the solution of (22) for e = em = 1, one arrives at a
candidate equilibrium. Going through similar procedures as above one obtains a reaction function
with similar properties up to parameter values including y = 8. For higher parameter values, e.g.
y = 9, the upward-sloping part of (22) no longer lies in the strategy space, so that solutions of the
type described here no longer exist.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 9
Step 1. To obtain a contradiction, assume the limit statement is not true, i.e. ∃² > 0 such that
∀y ∈ R+, ∃y′ > y with a∗1(y′) ≤ V − ². This includes the possibility that a∗1 converges to a value
other than V and that a∗1 does not converge. We keep ² with the above property fixed for the rest
of the proof.
Step 2. We then claim that ∃y¯ such that, for all y > y¯, a∗2(y)(a∗1(y)) = 0 whenever a∗1(y) ≤
V − ². To prove this claim, observe that e = a∗2(y)(w) maximizes U2(e, w) = ew − d(e) +
yk21(e, w)λ212(w, a∗2(y)) according to Lemma 1, for any w ∈ [0, V ]. Since k21(e, V ) = p˜i1(V, e) −
pie1(V ) = −pie1(V ) is independent of e, we must have a∗2(y)(V ) = a˜2(V ). Then, since p˜i2(e, w) is
strictly increasing in w, we obtain pih2 (a∗2(y)) = p˜i2(a˜2(V ), V ). We also must have pil2(a∗2(y)) ≥
p˜i2(a∗2(y)(a∗1(y)), a∗1(y)), which implies
pie2(a
∗
2(y)) ≥
p˜i2(a˜2(V ), V ) + p˜i2(a∗2(y)(a∗1(y)), a∗1(y))
2
.
Then, since λ212(w, a∗2(y)) = p˜i2(a∗2(y)(w), w)− pie2(a∗2(y)), we obtain
λ212(a∗1(y), a
∗
2(y)) ≤
1
2
[p˜i2(a∗2(y)(a
∗
1(y)), a
∗
1(y))− p˜i2(a˜2(V ), V )] .
Furthermore, it holds that
1
2
[p˜i2(a∗2(y)(a
∗
1(y)), a
∗
1(y))− p˜i2(a˜2(V ), V )] ≤
1
2
[p˜i2(a˜2(V − ²), V − ²)− p˜i2(a˜2(V ), V )] ≡ η
if a∗1(y) ≤ V − ², so that λ212(a∗1(y), a∗2(y)) ≤ η < 0. Now consider the derivative of player 2’s utility
function w.r.t. e for given w = a∗1(y):
∂U2(e, a∗1(y))
∂e
= a∗1(y)− d′(e) + yλ212(a∗1(y), a∗2(y))(V − a∗1(y)).
Using the above results, it then holds that
∂U2(e, a∗1(y))
∂e
≤ (V − ²) + yη².
Hence whenever y > y¯ ≡ −(V − ²)/(²η), we have that U2(e, a∗1(y)) is strictly decreasing in e ∈ [0, 1],
39
which implies a∗2(y)(a∗1(y)) = 0.
Step 3. Steps 1 and 2 together imply that ∃y′ > y¯ such that a∗1(y′) ≤ V −² and a∗2(y′)(a∗1(y′)) = 0.
This implies p˜i1(a∗1(y′), a∗2(y′)(a∗1(y′))) = 0. We now claim that ∃w′ < V such that a∗2(y′)(w′) > 0.
Consider again the derivative ∂U2(e, w)/∂e = w− d′(e) + y′λ212(w, a∗2(y′))(V −w). As w → V , the
reciprocity term goes to zero (because λ212(w, a∗2(y′)) is bounded), so ∂U2(0, w)/∂e→ V −d′(0) > 0,
implying a∗2(y′)(w′) > 0 for some sufficiently large w′ < V . But then p˜i1(w′, a∗2(y′)(w′)) > 0 =
p˜i1(a∗1(y′), a∗2(y′)(a∗1(y′))), which contradicts that a∗(y′) = (a∗1(y′), a∗2(y′)) ∈ A (y′).
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